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I. INTRODUCTION
n 1989 Sylvia Tsao and her twenty-two month old son were
passengers on United Airlines Flight 232. During the flight,
the tail engine blew apart resulting in a loss of hydraulic power,
which is needed to control the plane.' During the next thirty
minutes, flight attendants instructed the 285 passengers on the
"brace position. 2 The parents of four small children, including
Tsao, were instructed according to proscribed procedure to
wrap their children in blankets and pillows and put them on the
floor.' Although an autopsy revealed that Tsao's son died from
smoke inhalation and not the injuries he sustained in the crash,
the memories Tsao retains of the last moments she saw her son
alive are a good indication that the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion (FAA) regulations on commercial flights need to be
reevaluated.
I remember being in the brace position with my son's head
tucked between my knees. Suddenly, the world seemed to end. I
saw... my son's body floating and flying at a very high rate of
speed down the right aisle towards the back of the plane, his
head first, his face away from me. He must have been traveling at
an incredible rate of speed.'
In July 1994 nine-month old Danasia Brown died of blunt
trauma after being hurled more than 120 miles per hour
through the cabin of a USAir flight.' On several occasions, the
National Transportation Safety Board has stated that if children
were properly restrained, they would have a greater chance of
avoiding fatal injuries in accidents.6 Since the 197 0s there has
been a movement by several organizations to introduce regula-
I See Matthew Brelis, Air Accidents Spur Move to Alter Rules On Seating Babies, Bos-
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tions that would require child restraint systems (CRS) to be used
aboard all United States air carriers. By not requiring the use of
child restraint systems, the FAA has failed to ensure the safety of
its young airline passengers.
This Comment addresses the need to mandate child restraint
system regulations for use during take-off, landing, taxiing, and
in-flight turbulence situations. The Comment begins by exam-
ining the magnitude of the problem. Next it addresses current
regulations and legislative history. Following this is a brief look
at the potential dangers passengers face when traveling on air-
lines. Next, proposed legislation in the Congress, its historical
features, policies, and recommendations is presented. Then the
positions of various organizations and lobbyists for and against
the mandation of child restraint systems, varying factors, poten-
tial risk analysis, and some of the findings of various studies are
discussed. Finally, this Comment examines some of the consti-
tutional arguments that have been voiced, followed by some of
the economic arguments and recommendations for the future.
II. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
For years laws have required that infants and children be se-
cured in car seats when traveling in automobiles.' Various stud-
7 See, e.g., 23 U.S.C. § 402 (1994); 49 C.F.R. § 571.213 (1997). Many state stat-
utes vary on the age and weight requirements for the use of child restraint sys-
tems in motor vehicles. Every state provides provisions regulating the
transportation of children in motor vehicles. See ALA. CODE § 32-5-222 (1975);
ALASKA STAT. §§ 28.05.095 to .099 (1996); ARIz. RE V. STAT. ANN. § 28-907 (West
Supp. 1996); ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-34-104 (Michie Supp. 1987); CAL. VEIl. CODE
§§ 27360-27364 (West Supp. 1997); COLO. REv. STAT. § 42-4-236 (1996); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 14-100a(d) (1996); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 4803 (Supp. 1997);
D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 40-1201 to -1208 (Supp: 1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 316.613
(West 1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-8-76 (Supp. 1997); HAWAII Rlv. STAT. § 291-
11.5 (Supp. 1996); IDAHO CODE § 49-763 (Supp. 1997); ILL. COMP. STAT. 25/2 to
25/6 (West 1997); IND. CODE § 9-13-2-23 (Supp. 1997); IOWA CODE § 321.446
(1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-1343 to -1347 (1996); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 189.125
(Michie Supp. 1996); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 32:295 (West 1996); ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 29, § 1368-B (Supp. 1997); MD. CODE ANN. TRANSP. I OR II § 22-412.2
(1997); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 7AA (West Supp. 1996); MIcHl. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 257.710d (West Supp. 1997); MINN. STAT. § 169.685 (1996); Miss.
CODE ANN. §§ 63-7-301 to -313 (Supp. 1997); Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 210.104 to .107
(Supp. 1984); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 61-9420 (1997); NEB. REv. STAT. ANN. § 60-
6,267 (Michie 1997); NEV. REv. STAT. § 484.474 (1996); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 265:107-a (Supp. 1997); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:3-76.2a (West Supp. 1997); N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 66-7-368 to -369 (Michie Supp. 1997); N.Y. VEH. & TRA. LAW
§ 1229-c (McKinney Supp. 1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-137.1 (1997); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 39-21-41.2 (Supp. 1996); Oirno REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.81
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ies that have been conducted in order to determine the
effectiveness of child restraint systems support this legislation."
Legislation for the use of child restraints first appeared in Ten-
nessee in 1978 and eventually appeared in every state by 1985.'
"There are 12,000 deaths every four months on our nation's
highways." °0 Even those parents who do not themselves buckle-
up often insist that their children do." It seems that the U.S.
Department of Transportation has concluded what the FAA has
not; the importance of child protection cannot be ignored. The
relative risk of injury to an unrestrained child is far greater than
that of a restrained one.
Over half a billion people fly on U.S. air carriers each year.1
2
The FAA has estimated that as many as four million infants fly
(Banks-Baldwin Supp. 1997); OKA. STAT. tit. 47, § 11-1112 (Supp. 1996); OR.
REV. STAr. § 483.490 (1997); 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 4581 to 4585 (West
Supp. 1996); R.I. GEN. LAws § 31-22-22 (1996); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 56-5-6410 to -
6470 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAwS §§ 32-37-1 to -4 (Michie
1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-9-602 (Supp. 1996); TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.
6701d, § 107B (West Supp. 1996); TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 545.412 (West
1997); UTA- CODE ANN. § 41-6-148.20 (Supp. 1997); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1258
(Supp. 1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-1095 (Michie Supp. 1996); WASH. REv. CODE
§ 46.61.687 (1997); W. VA. CODE § 17C-15-46 (Supp. 1997); Wis. STAT.
§ 347.48(4) (1995-96); Wvo. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-5-1301 to -1305 (Michie 1997).
8 See Carden Johnston et al., Children in Car Crashes: Analysis of Data for Injury
and Use of Restraints, 93 AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS 960 (1994). This study ex-
amined the effects of car restraints on auto injury rates for children between the
ages of zero to fourteen years of age. See id. The use of car seats by children
between the ages of zero and four reduced injuries by 60%. See id. The use of
the shoulder lap harness was only 38% effective for children between the ages of
five and fourteen. See id. There was a greater percentage of injuries among those
children who used no restraint systems at all. The study concluded that
"[g]reater involvement in car crashes and less use of car restraints explains 64%
higher rate of injury for [three] year olds then for infants." Id. This particular
study indicated that a better restraint should be developed for school age chil-
dren due to the fact restraints designed for adults are not as effective. See id.
This may be an additional consideration for the FAA to examine in the future.
9 See AnneMarie Shelness & Seymour Charles, Children and Car Seats, 77 A,.
ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS 256 (1986). Interestingly, guidelines for "model safety belt
laws formulated by the U.S. Department of Transportation in 1973, excluded
children younger than the age of [six] years a stipulation we strongly opposed...
we knew then, as we know today, that the use of belts is preferable even for small
children than no restraint at all." Id.
14 Child Restraint Systems on Aircraft: Hearings on II.R. 1309 Before Committee on
Transp. and Infrastructure on Transp. Aviation, 105th Cong. (1996) (statement of
Honorable John J. Duncan, Jr., Chairman).
II See Faye Bowers, Child Safety vs Higher Cost of Travel, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Mar. 21, 1997, at 1.
12 See Industry/Government Team Develops Turbulence Training, U.S. DEP'T OF
TRANSP., July 31, 1997, available in 1997 WL 430049.
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annually in the United States alone.13 As with automobiles, the
U.S. government has imposed stringent safety regulations in or-
der to keep passengers safe. Interestingly enough, as with the
safety regulations first implemented for cars, these regulations
have excluded young children.14 Representative Peter DeFazio
of Oregon stated that "[a]dults are required to wear seat belts,
luggage must be stowed, and even coffee pots must be re-
strained during take-off, landing, and turbulence."' 5 It must be
questioned how concern about the possibility of a coffee pot
hurtling through the cabin of a plane can be placed above con-
cern of the possibility of a small child being placed in the same
situation.
The main difference between automobiles and airlines is that
there are no regulations requiring children under the age of
two to be restrained. Children are free to ride on the laps of
their parents during flights. During the past few decades there
have been several accidents in which unrestrained children have
been severely injured or killed. Several advocates argue that if
the industry would make a practice of using child restraint sys-
tems, many of these deaths or injuries would be prevented. In
addition, legislation mandating the use of these restraint systems
would prevent injuries or death. 6
In order to mandate the use of child restraint systems, the
FAA will have to abolish regulations which currently allow chil-
dren under the age of two to ride in the laps of an adult without
restraints." Infants should be afforded the same protection as
adults, who, by law, are required to be restrained. Though the
airlines currently have a "satisfactory" safety record, it is unrealis-
tic, if not impossible, to expect that a person will be able to hold
on to an infant against the extreme forces that are experienced
during a crash or in-flight turbulence.' 8
13 See Airline Infant Safety Seats Required, 132(6) AVIATION WK. & SPACE TEc4.,
Feb. 5, 1990, at 17.
14 See Shelness & Charles, supra note 9.
15 Bowers, supra note 11.
16 See generally, infra Part V.B.
17 See Airline Infant Safety Seats Required, supra note 13.
18 See id.
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III. POTENTIAL DANGERS PASSENGERS FACE
Approximately 575 million passengers traveled on airlines in
1996.19 It is estimated that domestic aviation operations will in-
crease by sixty percent in the next ten years. 2' Airline passen-
gers in general can unknowingly face danger from many
unforeseen situations. Over half of the serious injuries that oc-
cur during flights happen after a seatbelt sign has been illumi-
nated. 2' For example, it is estimated that United Airlines
accounts for twenty-one percent of total passenger miles flown
by the fourteen largest carriers in the United States.2 2 "Extrapo-
lating the 462 incidents to the entire United fleet yields some
2,800 incidents, or about 900 per year. Assuming the same rate
for other carriers yields a figure of some 4,500 injuries per year,
or about a dozen injuries per day. ' ' 2 3 Passengers have been in-
jured during taxiing, take-off, and landing, as well as in-flight
turbulence. In-flight turbulence injuries are among the most
frequent type of nonfatal passenger injuries.24
Higher incidents of injury during the "cruise phase" of the
flight can be explained by in-flight turbulence.2 5 Such incidents
normally occur when overhead bin compartments pop open
and the contents are ejected, becoming unguided missiles trav-
eling at incredible rates of speed.26 Various procedures have
been implemented to reduce the incidents of injury from falling
objects. For example, post-landing announcements are given to
passengers warning them to use caution when opening over-
head compartments. 27 Additionally, many airlines limit the
number of carry-on items a passenger may have in addition to
banning the storage of heavy items in the overhead
compartments. 28
"I See Testimony of Jim Hall, Regarding Fiscal Year 1998 Budget Request Before the
Subcommittee on Transportation and Related Agencies of the Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives (1997) available in 1997 WL 11233124 (statement of Jim
Hall, National Transportation Safety Board).
20 See id.
21 See Injuries From Overhead Bin Spillage Can Be Virtually Eliminated, AIR SAFETY










During any given year, headlines such as Rocky Right Fatal to 1/
102 Hurt as 747 Hits Turbulence can be found in the news.29 Pas-
sengers have stated that safety is one of their major concerns
when flying. A poll conducted by Money magazine in 1997
found safety fears an important element when consumers
choose an airline.3 0 "[Ninety-four percent] of respondents said
that it is a 'critical' or 'very important' element in choosing an
airline. 13 1 Tragic accidents, though they do not occur as fre-
quently as one might believe, are often the most memorable in
the minds of passengers. Though airline travel continues to be
the safest way to travel, 32 all passengers should be afforded the
same safety precautions.
IV. REGULATING COMMERCIAL AIRLINES
Title 49 of the United States Code currently states that the
Secretary of Transportation "shall consider. . ., as being in the
public interest and consistent with public convenience and ne-
cessity: (1) assigning and maintaining safety as the highest prior-
ity in air commerce. 33 In maintaining such an interest, one
would hope that regulations that are in the best interest of pub-
lic safety would be implemented and that the FAA would help to
support such regulations. The FAA's current regulations re-
garding the use of child restraint systems are inconsistent with
the Code.
According to the Flight Rules of the Code of Federal Regula-
tions, a child who has not reached its second birthday and does
not occupy or use a restraining device may be held in the lap of
an adult. 34 This regulation is no different from other regulations
29 Rocky Flight Fatal to 1/102 Hurt as 747 Hits Turbulence, NEWSDAY, Dec. 29,
1997, at A06; see also 9 News Daybreak (ABC television broadcast, July 12, 1995).
s0 See Peter Keating, The Best Airlines to Fly Today; Our Data Shows Southwest is Best
at What Matters Most to You, MONEY, Nov. 1, 1997, at 118.
31 Id.
32 See id.
33 49 U.S.C. § 40,101 (1994).
34 See 14 C.F.R. § 91.107 (1997). This section discusses the use of safety belts,
shoulder harnesses, and child restraint systems. See id. In addition, the section
provides that a child may occupy an approved child restraint system bearing ap-
propriate labels. See id. This regulation reads in part:
[a] unless otherwise authorized by the Administrator-
(3) Except as provided in this paragraph, each person on board a
U.S. registered aircraft . . . must occupy an approved seat or
berth with a safety belt and, if installed, shoulder harness,
properly secured about him . . . during movement on the sur-
1998] 313
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In 1953 Civil Air Regulations excluded children under the age
of two from mandatory safety regulations requiring the use of
seat belts aboard airplanes.35 Studies determined that young
children could not properly use adult seats because their bodies
had not matured enough to fit the contours of an airplane seat
with a seat belt. Therefore, they were excluded from the
mandatory safety regulation. 6
Since the 1960s the FAA and others have conducted research
in an attempt to improve child safety aboard aircraft.3 In 1973
the FAA began a study of child restraint systems, but the reports
were "less than encouraging" due to the fact that none of the
existing child seats were designed for the severe orientations ex-
perienced in a plane crash. 38 After the crash of a United Air-
lines flight in 1979 that killed ten people, three of which were
children under the age of two, the FAA began to establish a task
force on child restraint systems. 3 9
The task force assessed seat standards given "the fact that [the
FAA did not] have seat standards and [did] not permit people
face, takeoff, and landing.... [However, n] otwithstanding the
preceding requirements of this paragraph, a person may:
(i) Be held by an adult who is occupying an approved seat or
berth provided that the person being held has not reached
his or her second birthday and does not occupy or use any
restraining device ....
(iii) Notwithstanding any other requirement of this chapter,
occupy an approved child restraint system furnished by
the operator or one of the persons described in para-
graph (a) (3) (iii) (A) of this section provided that:
(A) The child is accompanied by a parent, guardian, or attendant
designated by the child's parent or guardian to attend to the safety
of the child during the flight.
Id.
35 See Child Restraint Systems on Aircraft: Hearings on II.R. 4025 Before the Sub-
comm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on Public Works and Transp., 101st Cong.
(1990) (statement of Walter S. Coleman, Vice President, OATA).
36 See id.
37 See id.
"8 See FAA Unit Studies Feasibility of Child Crash Restraints, AVIA-riON WK. & SPACE




to use automobile seats during takeoffs and landings because
they must be stowed as luggage .. ."40 Today it appears that
even if the task force had been able to develop some plausible
solution, the FAA still would not have mandated requirements
for the use of child restraint systems.
2. Current Policies
Current Federal Aviation Regulations do not require parents
of young children under the age of two to purchase separate
seats for them.41 In 1996 the FAA "issued a final rule to ban the
use of booster seats, as well as harness and vest-type child re-
straints systems aboard all U.S. carriers."4 2 This ruling resulted
from a series of tests conducted by the FAA's Civil Aeromedical
Institute (CAMI) indicating that these types of restraints did not
provide adequate protection for infants and toddlers during
takeoff, landing, and during aircraft movement on the
ground.43
Test results indicated that booster seats only elevated a child
without providing adequate protection to their backs or sides,
and, in some cases, adequate belting was not available to secure
the child.44 Also in 1996, the FAA recommended that all chil-
dren, regardless of age, be protected by a child restraint system
device of some sort.45 This recommendation included: "chil-
dren under 20 pounds be restrained in an approved rear-facing
CRS; children weighing 20-40 pounds should use an approved
forward-facing CRS; children weighing over 40 pounds should
use the standard lap belt [found on aircraft] seats."46 This rec-
ommendation appears to be somewhat of a contradiction be-
40 Id.
41 See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. § 91.107 (a)(3)(i) (1997). See also FAA Bans the Use of
Booster Seats, and Harness and Vest Child Restraints Aboard Aircraft, Department of




44 See id. The CAMI test results indicated that:
booster seats elevate children without providing a side or back pro-
tective shell and, in some cases, provide no integral belts to help
restrain the child. Vest and harness restraints do not attach to any
type of rigid shell or platform and leave the child free to come in
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cause while the FAA acknowledges the need for such restraints,
it simultaneously refuses to mandate any regulations.
B. PROPOSED LEGISLATION
1. History
There have been numerous proposals introduced in support
of mandating the use of child restraint systems. In recent years,
Representative Jim Lightfoot has been one of the most active
advocates for such legislation. In 1990 Lightfoot introduced a
bill to mandate that child safety restraints be required on all
United States commercial aircraft,47 after the 1989 crash of
United Airlines flight in Sioux City, Iowa, claimed the life of two
toddlers.48 During his statement in support of H.R. 1309 at the
Capitol Hill hearing in 1996, Lightfoot referenced the 1989
United Airlines crash that was followed by an Avainca Boeing
707 crash on Long Island, New York, which injured seven chil-
dren-one of whom died-in addition to the 1994 USAir crash
in Charlotte, North Carolina.49 Lightfoot indicated that the
mothers of the children survived because the FAA insists they be
restrained during flight.5"
2. Current Recommendations
Currently, there are three bills that have been introduced in
the 105th Congress's first session. The first, which was intro-
duced in the Senate, has subsequently been referred to the
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. 51 This
47 In the 103d Congress, Jim Lightfoot offered a proposal similar to that of
H.R. 1309, which is currently before Congress. See Lightfoot Introduces Bill to Re-
quire Child Safety Seats, AVIATION DAILY, Mar. 27, 1995, at 480. The 103d Congress
chose to adopt a requirement that airlines provide child safety restraints only
upon request for children holding tickets. See id. Congress also adopted the Sen-
ate language, which required a study on "availability, effectiveness, cost and use-
fulness of restraint systems for children on aircraft." Id.
48 See Child Restraint Systems on Aircraft: Hearings on I.R. 1309 Before Comm. on
Transp. and Infrastructure on Transp. Aviation, 105th Cong. (1996) [hereinafter
Lightfoot Testimony] (statement of Congressman Jim Lightfoot).
49 See id. The crashes of United Airlines Flight 232 and Avainca Airlines Flight
52 provide excellent examples of the dangers children face when seated in the
laps of an adult without adequate restraint systems in place.
50 See id.
51 See S. 398, 105th Cong. (1997). This bill is sponsored by Senator Patty Mur-
ray D-WA. Suggested changes include the requirement of a section establishing
age or weight limits for children who use the safety restraint systems. See id. In
addition, the proposal seeks to establish an international standard that requires
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bill proposes to amend Title 49 of the United States Code and
requires the use of approved child restraint systems on commer-
cial aircraft as well as other purposes.52
The second bill, 105 H.R. 1141, was introduced by Demo-
cratic Representative Peter A. DeFazio of Oregon.53 This bill
proposes to amend Title 49 of the U.S. Code, requiring the use
of child restraint systems on commercial aircraft in addition to
restricting the fares that are charged by air carriers for the trans-
portation of children under the age of three.54 The House bill
proposes to prohibit air carriers from charging a price in excess
of the lowest price charged to other paying passengers on the
same flight. 55
The final proposed change (105 H.R. 754), was also intro-
duced by Peter DeFazio. 56 This proposal simply amends Title 49
to require the use of child safety restraint systems. This bill
also directs the implementation of an international standard
that requires passenger restraint during take-off, landings, and
at the instruction of the captain.58 Of the three proposals to
date, it appears that this version has the greatest support with
seventy co-sponsors, sixty-two Democrats, and seven
Republicans. 59
passengers to be restrained on takeoff, landing, and when directed by the captain
of the plane. See id.
52 See id. The proposed changes require the use of approved child safety re-
straint systems on all aircraft operated by air carriers providing interstate or for-
eign air transportation. See id.
53 H.R. 1141, 105th Cong. (1997).
54 See id. The proposed changes require the Secretary of Transportation to
issue regulations requiring the use of approved child safety restraint systems for
carriers providing interstate, intrastate, or foreign air transportation. See id.
These regulations also establish age or weight limits for the children designated
to use such systems. See id. The section also includes regulations requiring air
carriers to provide free air transportation to children under the age of three. See
id.
55 See 105 Bill Tracking H.R. 1141 (1997).
56 H.R. 754, 105th Cong. (1997).
57 See id.
58 See id.
59 See 105 Bill Tracking H.R. 754 (1997).
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V. TAKING SIDES
A. OPPOSITION TO CHANGE: THE FEDERAL AVIATION
ADMINISTRATION
The FAA has made several arguments to justify its decision
not to mandate the use of child restraint systems on commercial
airlines. Three popular arguments have been that: 1) economic
factors from such a mandate would be detrimental to both the
airline industry as well as to consumers; 2) improbability of the
risk of death to a child under the age of two renders such a
mandate unnecessary; and 3) increases in automobile related
deaths are an adequate deterrent to mandating such a require-
ment. Opponents to federal intervention question whether the
Federal government should be allowed to mandate a parents'
behavior in relation to their child when the risk of harm, due to
the good safety record of the airline industry is so low.6 °
1. Economic Factors
a. Increase in Cost of Tickets
In June of 1995, the FAA released a report to Congress that
stated many families would find other methods of transporta-
tion rather than air travel if they faced additional costs of
purchasing tickets for their children." The FAA also claims that
even if airlines offered lower fares for infant tickets, even as
much as a twenty-five percent discount off the full fare price,
some families would still choose alternate methods of
transportation .62
The FAA continually attempts to justify their position by stat-
ing that research results indicate families would not favor any
increase in costs for air travel. Studies indicate that such a man-
date, causing families to pay full fares for every family seat,
would create an additional cost of approximately $200 for each
family." "In other words, families would pay an additional $109
million per year to fly."" 4 In order to save parents an estimated
60 See Airline Infant Seats Required, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TEcii., Feb. 5, 1990, at
17.
61 See Brelis, supra note 1.
62 See Child Restraint Systems on Aircraft: Hearings on H.R. 1309 Before Comm. on
Transp. and Infrastructure on Transp. Aviation, 105th Cong. (1996) [hereinafter
Gilligan Testimony] (statement of Margaret Gilligan, Deputy Associate Administra-





one billion dollars a year, the FAA claims they prefer to educate
parents about using child restraint systems, as opposed to re-
quiring their usage.65
b. Purchase of Child Restraint Systems by Airlines
Another argument with regard to requiring child restraint sys-
tems revolves around the cost of providing the child restraint
systems. The FAA advocates parental education as a less expen-
sive alternative than requiring that airlines purchase child re-
straint systems for use by passengers under the age of two. This
argument is fairly weak, however, because parents of small chil-
dren are currently required to supply their own federally ap-
proved restraint system if they desire a child restraint during
flights.
66
c. Revenue Loss to Airline Industry
In 1990 the FAA presented findings from research conducted
by Apogee Research to the Congressional subcommittee. These
findings indicated that the required use of child safety seats
would cost more lives than it would save.67 This loss, according
to the FAA, was attributed to the shift in consumers' traveling
methods. 6' Advocates for the use of child safety restraints claim
that the underlying fear is that these potential shifts will cut the
amount of profit seen by the airline industry.
2. Improbability of the Risk
Another popular argument is that the number of small chil-
dren actually killed in commercial air crashes each year is low,
and therefore mandating child restraint legislation is unneces-
sary. The FAA insists that they prefer a parental educational
program addressing the benefits of using child restraint systems,
rather than mandating a rule requiring the purchase of addi-
tional child passenger tickets.69 In support of their position, the
FAA estimates that the use of child restraint systems would only
prevent five infant fatalities during the next ten years.70 How-
65 See Good Morning America (ABC television broadcast, Dec. 18, 1996).
66 See Newsnigh. American Airlines Cuts Fares for Child Safety (CNN Newsnight
television broadcast, July 3, 1997).
67 See Lightfoot Testimony, supra note 48.
68 See Gilligan Testimony, supra note 62.
69 See Brelis, supra note 1.
70 See Gilligan Testimony, supra note 62.
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ever, this figure does not take into account the number of non-
fatal injuries infants would sustain from turbulence-related
accidents.
The FAA's Deputy Administrator, Linda Daschle, presented
several activities implemented by the organization to support ef-
forts to enhance air safety for children.7 1 During an interview
with Joan Lunden in 1996, Daschle stated that the FAA has dis-
covered that in-flight turbulence was also a leading cause for in-
juries to passengers.] 2 In light of this new information, the FAA
has recommended that parents "work with the airline [s]" to en-
sure the safety of their child.7"
Conceeding that there are many airlines offering seats for
children under the age of two for free if a seat is available on the
flight, the FAA asserts that one of the most difficult decisions
they had to make was whether or not to require a parent to
purchase a seat before permitting the use of a child restraint
system.74 The FAA decided against the requirement in hopes of
encouraging airlines in making travel easier for parents travel-
ing with small children.7 5 Though the FAA's desire to en-
courage airlines is an admirable goal, the airline industry has
taken its own initiative, without prompting from the FAA, and
the majority of airlines currently offer reduced fares for children
under the age of two. 76
3. Increase in Automobile Related Deaths
Finally, the FAA continues to assert that the requirement of
mandatory child restraint regulations "would kill more children
than it would save by increasing the cost of air travel and forcing
families to chose less expensive-but far less safe-travel alter-
native."7 The FAA estimates that there would be an increase of
seventeen deaths on our nation's highways over a period of ten
years if the use of child restraint systems was made mandatory.





76 Many United States carriers have already implemented programs that offer
seats at half the price of an ordinary fare. See AFA Carriers for Advocacy of Child
Safety Seats, AVIATION DAILY, July 7, 1997, at 26.
77 REIL TRAv IL GROUP, FAA Refuses to Buckle Down Kids; Federal Aviation Admin-
istration Will Not Adopt Rules Requiring Children to be Buckled Down During Flights,
TRAVL WEEKLY, June 12, 1995, at 1.
7 See Gilligan Testimony, supra note 62.
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While standing by its proposition that a mandate would cause
more deaths, the FAA also claims it has implemented programs
to get children "off laps and into straps. ' 79 This seems to be a
contradiction.
Margaret Gilligan, Deputy Associate Administrator for Regula-
tion and Certification, appeared before the House Committee
on Transportation and Infrastructure during the Hearings Sub-
committee on Aviation Concerning H.R. 1309 in 1996.0 During
this testimony, Gilligan stated that the FAA did not require the
use of child restraint systems because its studies showed the use
would result in a larger number of deaths and injuries from the
diversion of passengers to other modes of transportation.,'
These studies were done by both the FAA and outside experts in
transportation and economics.
The FAA asserts that families will find other means of travel
and only twenty-seven percent of families with infants would still
travel by air. 2 In addition, its studies indicated that fifty-three
percent of these families would not travel at all, while twenty
percent would chose other modes of transportation. 3 From
these results, the FAA estimates an additional eighty-two deaths
would occur on our nation's highways over the next ten years
due to the twenty percent shift.84
B. ADVOCATES FOR CHANGE
For over seventeen years, the National Transportation Safety
Board has advocated that the FAA require child safety restraint
systems on airplanes.85 The Association of Flight Attendants
Union, representing more than 36,000 members and twenty-
four airlines, stated that "[i] t is inconceivable, given the strict
rules of everything on the aircraft... that must be tied down or
securely stowed for takeoff and landing, or in flight when ...
necessary, that the same consideration is not given to human
beings even though they are under the age of 2. "86 Various or-





83 See Gilligan Testimony, supra note 62.
84 See id. Note that this estimate differs from the FAA's previous estimate dis-
cussed supra, section V.A.
85 See Brelis, supra note 1.
86 Id.
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aviation industry groups, the Safe America Foundation, and
Safety Belt Safe USA, as well as unions, including the Association
of Flight Attendants and the Air Line Pilots Association have ad-
vocated for the FAA to mandate the use. 7
The White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Secur-
ity's Final Report, released February 12, 1997, urges the FAA to
reconsider its position on the usage of child safety seats." The
"Gore Commission's Report," as it has become known, encour-
ages the FAA to reduce its reliance on "cost benefit analysis
when weighing safety laws." 9 Recommendation 1.13 places re-
sponsibility for mandatory child safety seats onto the FAA.90
1. Association of Flight Attendants
The Association of Flight Attendants (AFA) has countered the
FAA's arguments based on the effect of increased prices by stat-
ing that incomplete data was used to reach its conclusion that
families would be diverted to traveling by less safe methods such
as cars. 91 Jill Gallagher, spokesperson for the AFA, stated that
the FAA merely averaged the major airline fares in certain mar-
kets and failed to look at the entry of low fare carriers into the
market.9 2 These low fares would cause the cost per passenger to
drop considerably.93 The bottom line in the FAA's argument is
87 See Child Restraint Systems on Aircraft: Hearings on H.R. 1309 Before Aviation
Subcomm. of the Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure, 104th Cong. 51 (1996) [here-
inafter Friend Testimony] (statement of Patricia A. Friend, International President
of the Association of Flight Attendants).
88 See Safety Commission Recommends Mandating Child Safety Seats, WORLD AIRLINE
NEws, Feb. 21, 1997.
89 Id. Recommendation 1.13 reads in part:
The FAA should eliminate the exemptions in the Federal Aviation
Regulations that allow passengers under the age of two to travel
without the benefit of FAA-approved restraints.
The Commission believes that is inappropriate for infants to be af-
forded a lesser degree of protection than older passengers. The
FAA should revise its regulations to require that ... all infants and
small children below the weight of 40 pounds and under the height
of 40 inches be restrained in an appropriate child restraint system.
Id.
90 Id.
91 See Safety Commission Recommends Mandating Child Safety Seats, WORLD AIRLINE





the fares.9 4 It seems unlikely that airlines would risk two fares
for the price of one child's fare. 95
Jan Brown-Lohr, a flight attendant with United Airlines and a
member of the Association of Flight Attendants, testified before
the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee in
1996.96 Brown-Lohr was the chief flight attendant in the Sioux
City accident in 1989. During her testimony, Brown-Lohr stated
that her primary responsibility was to the passengers on the
flight, and during this experience she discovered that the "safety
of the passengers only applies to those over the age of two years
old.""
Brown-Lohr recounted how the flight attendants prepared
the passengers for the emergency landing during the forty min-
utes prior to impact. It was not until later that she remembered
there were several lap children aboard and proceeded to in-
struct the parents to place the children on the floor at the par-
ents' feet.98 Perhaps the most striking part of her testimony is
her recollection of meeting Tsao, whose story was mentioned in
the introduction, in the cornfield after the impact had
occurred. 99
The plane broke into three sections. It became engulfed in a
flash fire and when my section finally stopped, it was upside
down in a cornfield... Making my way through the cornfield,
the first passenger I met was Sylvia Tsao, the mother of [twenty-
two] month old Evan. Mrs. Tsao was the same mother I com-
forted and reassured immediately after the engine exploded. She
was trying to return . . . to find Evan who had flown from her
grasp on impact... Sylvia Tsao then looked up at me and said
"you told me to put my baby on the floor, I did, and he's gone."
My first thought was "I'll have to live with this for the rest of my
life." I then replied, "that was the best thing to do, that was all we
had." Evan was killed upon impact."00
Children face several serious hazards that most people are un-
aware of when they are flying in the laps of their parents. The
two most serious hazards are that a child may be injured as he or
94 See id.
95 See id.
96 See Child Restraint Systems Aboard Aircraft: Hearings on H.t. 1309 Before Aviation
Subcomm. of the Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure, 104th Cong. 43 (1996) (state-
ment of Jan Brown-Lohr, Association of Flight Attendants, AFL-CIO).
97 Id.
98 See id.
99 See id. at 43-44.
1oo Id. at 44.
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she strikes the aircraft interior during a crash or turbulence 10
and that the parents may not be able to find the child after a
crash, and the child may therefore be killed by the ensuing fire
or other dangers. 112 For example, during the Sioux City, Iowa
crash the children were not properly restrained, and it was diffi-
cult, and in one case impossible, to find the children after
impact. 103
As Ms. Friend explained before the subcommittee,
[a] cursory physics lesson will explain why there is only one safe
way for children under two to fly. An airplane is designed to
withstand 9 g of horizontal loads without total destruction.
Therefore, given a 9 g force, a 20 pound child would weigh the
equivalent of 180 pounds, well beyond the ability of most people
to maintain a hold. While they themselves are being jostled and
thrust in the direction of the force, there is an emotional compo-
nent as well. People may panic during continual turbulence.
The difficulty of trying to hold onto their child becomes more
severe. Grim as it sounds, lap-held children can become "mis-
siles" in a turbulent cabin.'0 4
The AFA commissioned its own study in response to the FAA's
position that mandating child safety restraints would cause more
deaths. 0 5 The AFA's study found five "shortcomings" in the
FAA's assumptions. 10 6 First, the FAA study lacked key data used
in determining price sensitivity.10 7 Second, the study used an
industry demand curve which unrealistically simplified a com-
plex situation. 08 Third, the FAA failed to take into account the
price competition generated by low-fare carriers.'0 9 Fourth, the
study failed to take into account the effects of income sensitiv-
ity. 10 Finally, the FAA failed to correctly measure cross elasticity
of demand."'
101 See Friend Testimony, supra note 87, at 51.
102 See id.
103 See id.
104 Id. at 52.
105 See id. at 53-54. The study refutes the FAA's Apogee Research, which
pointed out that travelers would divert from air travel to other methods such as
automobiles. It was indicated that these travelers were more likely to be injured










The AFA's study found no valid evidence to support the no-
tion that travelers would be diverted to other methods of travel
due to mandatory use of child restraint systems.1 12 The AFA's
study shows that the assumptions used by the FAA are "unrealis-
tic and have little or no relation to the aviation industry as it now
exists."11 According to the AFA, the Apogee Study failed to
consider an entire new generation of air travel that directly com-
petes with the automobile.l' Increased competition has contin-
ued to push the price of air travel down over the years. 115
The AFA study also found that the Apogee Study was flawed in
its economic analysis.' 6 The correct measure to use when de-
termining if people will drive rather than fly if airline prices go
up is cross elasticity of demand. 17 The FAA used a measure of
"own price elasticity" instead.' 1 8 The measure of cross elasticity
relates to the change in sales of one product when the price of a
substitute product changes." 9 It measures how many people
would stop flying and travel by car if the prices of airline tickets
increased. 120 When using own price elasticity one cannot make
inferences as to what people might do.12' Thus, cross elasticity is
the correct measure. 22
The AFA also attacks the FAA's claim that some child restraint
seats are not acceptable for use as a reason for not mandating
the use of restraint systems on airlines. 123 The Civil Aeromedical
Institute has identified four forward-facing child restraint seats
that are adequate for use on airplanes. 124 In addition, all rear-
facing seats for children under twenty pounds have been deter-
mined to be appropriate for use. 125 The AFA acknowledges that
the seats have only been tested for crash situations and not for
112 See id. The AFA's study was conducted by Darryl Jenkins, a visiting scholar




115 See id. at 55.
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in-flight turbulence. 26 Though studies continue, the AFA as-
serts that the FAA must agree that being restrained is the safest
way for any passenger, including small children, to travel. 1
27
In response to the FAA's final rule to ban the use of booster
seats and vest harness, the AFA claims the rule only prohibits
their use during take-off, landing, and taxiing. 128 Even though
the devices create an extreme hazard, they may still be used dur-
ing flight. 129 The AFA has questioned the rationale behind per-
mitting a device that creates such a hazard to be used at all.' °
"Rather than fix the problem, the FAA has managed, unnecessa-
rily, to create a more confusing and chaotic situation among air-
lines and passengers."'3 1
The message of the AFA is clear. Children need to be re-
strained when traveling in aircraft. The organization urges Con-
gress to implement legislation to assist them in protecting the
lives of these small children. 132 In addition, the AFA wants the
FAA to correct the current final ban on booster, harness and
vests by banning their use completely, not just during takeoff,
landing and taxiing. 3
3
2. National Transportation Safety Board
Since 1979 the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
has been issuing safety recommendations regarding the use of
child restraint systems aboard aircraft. 134 In 1990 the NTSB rec-
ommended that all occupants of planes be restrained during
take-off, landing, and turbulent conditions. 31 In addition, it
suggested that infants and small children be restrained in an
approved child restraint system. 136 At the hearing before the
committee in 1990, the NTSB "concluded that unrestrained in-
126 See id.





132 See id. at 58.
133 See id.
13" See Regarding Legislation to Require the Use of Child Safety Restraint Systems
Aboard Aircraft: Hearings on H.R. 1309 Before Subcomm. on Aviation Transp. and In-
frastructure, 104th Cong. 83 (1996) [hereinafter Sweedler Testimony] (statement of






fants and small children were not being offered the same level
of protection" as adults were. 3 7
As a result of an infant being killed in a DC-9 accident in
1994, the NTSB issued two recommendations. 13 8 The first rec-
ommendation was that all infants and small children be re-
strained, and the second recommendation was to develop
forward facing child restraints for use in aircraft. 13 9 The FAA's
response to these recommendations was to urge the NTSB to
reconsider the recommendation for regulatory action."0
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS
The proposed changes for child restraint legislation invite
controversy. Whether or not lawmakers should step in and
make child restraint systems mandatory for those under the age
of two has sparked heated controversy. Some question the gov-
ernment's right to step in and impose legislation, which would
require the use of child restraint systems in aircraft. The oppo-
nents have brought up issues of personal freedom. Supporters
have raised issues of statistics and research results in order to
prove their point. The question remains as to whether public
safety will prevail over private autonomy.
Do children under the age of two legally have a right in this
matter, or is it merely the parents' choice? The Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the United States Constitution "mandates equality
under the law for all persons, regardless of race, gender, socio-
economic condition, nationality, age, place or duration of resi-
dence, etc."'' The Fourteenth Amendment provides:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.' 42
The amendment's equal protection clause generally controls all
governmental actions that classify individuals for different bene-
fits or burdens under the law.
137 Id.
138 See id.
139 See id. at 84.
140 See id. at 83.
141 RALPt-i A. ROSSUM & G. ALAN TARR, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 605 (3d
ed. 1991).
142 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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Analysis of federal equal protection takes a three-tiered ap-
proach. The first tier involves classifications affecting suspect
groups or fundamental rights and is subject to "strict scru-
tiny." 1413 The second tier involves classifications in which semi-
suspect groups or important rights are reviewed under "height-
ened scrutiny." '144 Other classifications are subject to "rational
review." 14 5
In general, most classifications are reviewed under the ra-
tional basis test.'4 ' The rational basis test is governed by the op-
eration of four general principles:
1. The Equal Protection Clause not only does not prohibit the
state from creating legal categories but also allows a great deal of
discretion in this regard; such categories, therefore, should be
invalidated only when they lack any reasonable basis and hence
are purely arbitrary.
2. A classification having some reasonable basis does not offend
against the Equal Protection Clause merely because it is not
made with mathematical nicety or because in practice its results
in some inequality.
3. When a classification in the law is called into question, it
should not be set aside if any state of facts can be conceived to
justify it, and the existence of that state of facts at the time the
law was enacted must be assumed.
4. The party challenging the classification must carry the burden
of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis.' 4
7
Because the Fourteenth Amendment only applies to state and
local governments, it serves as a benchmark with which to com-
pare state equal protection clauses. In guaranteeing that simi-
larly situated people are treated alike, the classifications of
groups cannot be drawn in ways that are inconsistent with the
Fourteenth Amendment.
A. EQUAL PROTECTION AND AUTOMOBILES
All fifty states have statutes making the use of child safety seats
or restraint systems mandatory. 4 In C.W Matthews Contracting
Co., Inc. v. Gover,'49 the Georgia Supreme Court did not make a
143 See RoSSUM & TARR, supra note 141, at 606.
144 See id. at 609.
145 See id. at 606.
146 See id.
147 Id. at 606-607.
148 See Shelness & Charles, supra note 9.
149 428 S.E.2d 796 (Ga. 1993).
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distinction between the state and federal equal protection
clauses.15 ° In upholding the statute, 151 the court stated:
[E] ncouraging the use of seat belts is a rational exercise of legis-
lative power. We do not believe that imposing limitations upon
the means of such encouragement is irrational ... [T] he classifi-
cation . . . is reasonable, is related to a legitimate state interest,
and treats all similarly situated persons equally, as it prohibits
anyone from offering, as evidence of negligence, the fact that a
party failed to wear a seat belt.1
52
The court also concluded that the legislature acted in a ra-
tional and non-discriminatory manner when it set out the state's
public policy.15 3 In doing so, the legislature accurately weighed
the benefits of having such a policy versus the severity of the
punishment for failing to adhere to the policy. 15
In Moffett v. Zitvogel,155 the defendants argued that the Dela-
ware statute"5 6 violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. The court disagreed, holding that it was
apparent the statute bore a rational relationship to a legitimate
state purpose, that is, the legislature apparently wanted to en-
sure that children under the age of four, injured in collisions
caused by the tortious conduct of others, would not be pre-
vented from recovering due to the separate negligence of their
parents or other persons charged with their care, for not placing
the child in a restraint system.'
150 Georgia's equal protection clause provides: "No person shall be denied the
equal protection of the laws." GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, II.
151 Section 40-8-76.1(b) provides "that [e]ach occupant of the front seat of a
passenger vehicle shall, while such passenger vehicle is being operated on a pub-
lic road . be restrained by a seat safety belt." GA. CODE ANN. § 40-8-76.1(b)
(1996).
152 Gover, 428 S.E.2d at 798-99.
154 See id. at 798.
154 See id.
155 No. 89C-0C27, 1990 Del. Super. LEXIS 312 (Del. Super. Ct. 1990).
156 See id. at *2. The statute provides that:
[E]very person shall be responsible, when transporting a child
under the age of four years and weighing less than forty pounds in
a motor vehicle operated on the roadways, streets or highways of
this State for providing for the protection of the child by properly
using a child passenger restraint system meeting Federal motor ve-
hicle safety standards .... ".21 DEL. CODE ANN. § 4199(c) (a)
(Supp. 1997).
157 See Moffett, 1990 Del. Super. LEXIS 312, at *9.
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In Moffett, the defendants argued that a privileged class was
created by children not secured in child restraint systems. 58 By
claiming the burdened class is composed of those children
whose parents or guardians comply with the statute, the defend-
ants attempted to establish that categories were treated differ-
ently. 59 The court, however, found that these were not classes
that were treated differently because neither class can have the
evidence of the non-use of a restraint system used against
them. 1
6 0
In Cressy v. Grassman, the defendant argued that the statute
was unconstitutional in that it allegedly violated the Equal Pro-
tection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 6 ' The court found the statute to be constitutional,
stating that the statutory classification serves two important func-
tions. It ensures that an accident victim is not denied a fair re-
covery: (1) by excessive expert witness fees that would be
required from the need to disprove that seat belt non-use
caused additional damages; and (2) by the effect that such non-
use would have on a jury's determination of comparative
fault. 162
B. EQUAL PROTECTION IN AvIATION
Regulations regarding the use of safety restraints in aircraft
are purely statutory classifications. The Federal Aviation Regula-
tions include the class of children and adults over the age of
two, but excludes children and infants under the age of two.
163
In short, the FAA's exclusion of children and infants under the
age of two from the requirement of wearing safety restraints is
an "underinclusive" statute. 64 The statute excludes a group in
need of the benefit and the burden of its requirements.
In applying an equal protection analysis, the United States
Supreme Court has consistently adopted a deferential posture,
following the rational basis test, when dealing with classifications
' Id. at *10.
159 See id.
160 See id.
161 536 N.W.2d 39 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
162 See id. at 42.
163 See 14 C.F.R. § 91.107 (1997).
164 An underinclusive classification means that a small group of individuals
who fit the design of the statute are included. However, the statute also excludes
some individuals who are similarly situated and is therefore underinclusive. See
ROSSUM & TARR, supra note 141.
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based on age. 165 However, the Court has refused to recognize
age as a "suspect class," due to the fact that it is a universal con-
dition that means that even if a statute was imposed on a class
defined as the aged it would not impose a sufficient distinction
as those cases where they have found classifications required
strict scrutiny. 166
C. EQUAL PROTECTION AND CHILDREN
UNDER THE AGE OF Two
Regulations involving safety requirements aboard aircraft are
regarded as statutory. By definition, passengers over the age of
two are afforded safety measures that must be adhered to. 167 By
denying children under the age of two the same sort of protec-
tion afforded to other passengers, the statutes are underinclu-
sive. The statutes exclude a group of individuals that are
similarly situated in need of the benefit and burden of the stat-
utes' requirements.
Because the United States Supreme Court has consistently
adopted the rational basis test when dealing with age,168 it is un-
likely that it would hold the regulations to be deserving of strict
scrutiny. The Equal Protection rights of children under the age
of two are violated by the refusal to mandate the requirement to
use child restraint systems. In order for such a mandate to be
labeled constitutional, it will need to meet the requirements of
the rational basis test. The mandate must be rationally and rea-
sonably related to a legitimate government interest.
Current Federal Aviation Regulations endanger the lives of in-
fants and children under the age of two. This is a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment-
the government is depriving these children "equal protection of
laws."' 69 In 1997 the United States Supreme Court held that mi-
nors were protected under the Constitution and that they pos-
sessed constitutional rights. 170 "Minors, as well as adults, are
protected by the Constitution and possess Constitutional
165 See id. at 614.
166 See id.
167 See 49 U.S.C. § 40,101 (1994); 14 C.F.R. § 91.14(3) (1997); 14 C.F.R.
§ 91.107 (1997); 14 C.F.R. § 1221.311(a)(1-2), (b) (1997).
168 See RossuM & TARR, supra note 141, at 614.
169 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
170 See Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 692 (1977) (challenging
the Constitutionality of a New York statute which prohibited the distribution of
contraceptives to anyone under the age of sixteen).
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Rights."'' Based on those Constitutional Rights, children
under the age of two are entitled to equal protection under the
law. In essence, "[n] either the Fourteenth Amendment nor the
Bill of Rights is for adults alone."'7 2
It can be said that the government has a compelling interest
in the irrational exclusion of children under the age of two from
aviation safety legislation. 73 Such irrational and arbitrary legis-
lation should clearly be unconstitutional in the denial of equal
protection of the laws to children by endangering their funda-
mental rights-their right to life. However, it is not likely that
the Court will view the lives of children under the age of two as a
fundamental right, a strong argument can be made for why a
rational basis type analysis should stand.
A rational and reasonable related standard must be found re-
lated to a reasonable government interest. There is no history
of law that gives an indication as to why children under the age
of two were excluded from aviation seat-belt regulations. In the
absence of such government interest, a finding of a compelling
governmental interest is not likely. Therefore, even under a ra-
tional basis review standard, it is not likely that current legisla-
tion that excludes children under the age of two will be deemed
unconstitutional.
VII. TORT LIABILITY
It has been well established that seat-belts have the ability to
reduce injuries and fatalities in accidents. Nevertheless, chil-
dren under the age of two are still allowed to ride on the laps of
their parents.
A. STATUS AS A COMMON CARRIER
A common carrier is generally defined as one who represents
himself to the public as engaged in the business of transporting
persons or property from destination to destination, for com-
171 Id. Minors are entitled to constitutional protection in various arenas such
as freedom of speech, equal protection against racial discrimination, in the civil
context-due process, a variety of rights of defendants in criminal proceedings,
prohibition of double jeopardy, the rights of notice, counsel, confrontation,
cross-examination, and protection from self-incrimination, and finally, protec-
tion from coerced confessions. See id. at 692 n.14.
172 Id.
173 See supra Part IV.
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pensation.17 4 A common carrier of passengers is one who car-
ries for hire anyone who may apply for passage, provided there
is sufficient space available and no legal excuse exists for
refusal. 175
A passenger has been defined as a person whom a common
carrier has contracted to carry from one destination to an-
other.1 76 In the course of the performance of that contract, the
passenger is received by the carrier by way of conveyance or at
the point of departure. 77 Under these general rules, airlines
catering to the public, who undertake the transport of passen-
gers, are found to be common carriers.
B. DUTIES AND DEGREE OF CARE REQUIRED
In general, a common carrier of passengers is said to be
under a duty to exercise either a high or the highest degree of
care for the safety of its passengers. 78 A passenger is a person
whom has contracted with a common carrier to be carried from
one place to another. 79 A carrier is not required to exercise any
degree of care that would be inconsistent with its methods of
transportation.'8 0
When children are passengers different issues sometimes
arise. The fact that an infant passenger was in the custody of his
174 See, e.g., Kelly v. General Electric Co., 110 F. Supp. 4, affd, 204 F.2d 692, cert.
denied 346 U.S. 886 (1953); Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. McCune, 836 F.2d
153, 160 (3d Cir. 1987); see also Lavelle v. Alert Ambulance Servs., 854 F. Supp. 60
(D.R.I. 1994). The Lavelle court held:
To be a common carrier, one must hold himself out to be: (1)
engaged in the business of transport...; (2) in this case the busi-
ness must be to transport persons...; (3) ... there need not be a
fixed route or movement between fixed termini; (4) the transport
must be undertaken for compensation, although the contract need
not be expressed or the rate fixed ... ; and (5) the services must be
offered to the public generally.
Id. at 63 (citation omitted).
175 See, e.g., Federal Communications Comm'n v. Midwest Video Corp., 440
U.S. 689, 701 (1979); National Ass'n of Regulatory Utility Comm'rs v. Fed. Com-
munications Comm'n, 525 F.2d 630, 641 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
176 See Birmingham Ry. Light & Power Co. v. Adams, 40 So. 385 (Ala. 1906);
Todd v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 113 N.E. 95 (Ill. 1916).
177 See Birmingham, 40 So. at 385; Todd, 113 N.E. at 95.
178 See, e.g., Bassell v. Hines, 269 F. 231 (6th Cir. 1920); Rainey v. Paquet
Cruises, Inc., 709 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1983); Muratore v. M/S Scotia Prince, 656 F.
Supp. 471 (D. Me. 1987).
179 See, e.g., Chipman v. Massachusetts Bay Trans. Auth., 316 N.E.2d 725, 729
(Mass. 1974).
180 See supra notes 178-79 and accompanying text.
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parent or guardian may affect the carrier's liability for injury in
two ways. First, it may affect their duty or standard of care. Sec-
ond, it may affect the existence of contributory negligence as a
bar to recovery, either directly or indirectly, due to some action
by the parent or action imputed to the child.
In general, a common carrier owes a high degree of care to its
passengers.'' Some courts impose special obligations upon car-
riers for the safety of infants traveling in the custody of their
parent or guardian. Other courts have followed the view that
the carrier may assume, at least in the absence of knowledge to
the contrary, that the custodian of the infant passenger will per-
form their primary duty of caring for the safety of the child. 82
It would seem logical to infer that it is consistent with air travel
for a carrier to exercise a degree of care in the prevention of
injury to its passengers during take-off, landing, and in-flight
turbulence.
VIII. ECONOMICS
The issue of child fares has created a great deal of contro-
versy. Travelers with small children, until recently, have been
limited to one option if they wanted their child secured in a
seat: to buy a full priced fare for their child. Today, they have
one of two options: 1) they can buy a ticket priced at half the
going adult fare; or 2) they can have their child ride for free on
their lap. However, the introduction of half-priced child fares
does not solve the continuing argument between opposing sides
on this issue.
One of the key factors in this ongoing battle is money. The
FAA is afraid that by mandating the use of child safety seats, the
airline industry will lose approximately one billion dollars a
year. 8 3 The irony of this situation is that airlines are more than
willing to reduce prices in order to help the parents of these
small passengers."8 4
181 See Crist v. Washington, Va. and Md. Coach Co., Inc., 85 S.E.2d 213 (Va.
1955); see also Shamblee v. Virginia Transit Co., 132 S.E.2d 712 (Va. 1963).
182 See Tri-State Coach Corp. v. Stidham, 62 S.E.2d 894 (Va. 1951); see also Nor-
folk & W. Ry. Co. v. Estepp, 204 F.2d 880 (6th Cir. 1953).
1s See supra Part V.A.1.
184 The price reduction for children applies to any published adult fare, in-
cluding the least expensive coach rates. If this price reduction is applied to the
following one-way fares for trips of more than 1500 miles (based on figures from
the year ended March 31, 1997) it can be seen that parents will benefit from this
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IX. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
People like Sylvia Tsao, Jan Brown-Lohr, and the mother of
Danasia Brown will never forget the deaths and injuries suffered
by children in the Sioux City, Iowa, United Airlines Flight 232
and New York Avianca Airlines Flight 52 crashes. Every day,
thousands of toddlers travel our nation's airways without the
benefit of being restrained by a child restraint system. The ever-
present danger infants and children under the age of two face
while traveling by air is an issue that needs to be addressed.
The reality that children under the age of two are still allowed
to travel on the laps of their parents or guardians contradicts
the overwhelming lessons learned by the nation's automotive in-
dustry. Commentary from experts and various case studies have
shown that child restraint systems are the best method to protect
children from serious injury or death when traveling. If every
state has recognized that children need protection when travel-
ing at high rates of speed on our nations highways, it seems obvi-
ous that they should be afforded the same sort of protection in
our nation's skies.
Strong arguments have been made in support of the passage
of legislation that would require the mandatory use of child re-
straint systems. Both experts and professionals alike recognize
the dangers of children under the age of two becoming un-
guided missiles traveling at speeds of 9 g during in-flight turbu-
lence or in the event of an accident.
Opposing arguments have also presented statistics and studies
that indicate that the cost of implementing such a mandate
would far outweigh by the number of deaths projected to occur
in the next few years. The Federal Aviation Administration has
reduction in fare price. See Peter Keating, The Best Airlines to Fly Today; Our Data
Shows Southwest is Best at What Matters Most to You, MON.Y, Nov. 1, 1997, at 118.
Airline Adult Children under two
1. Southwest $116 $ 58.00
2. America West 161 80.50
3. TWA 193 96.50
4. Continental 199 99.50
5. Northwest 203 101.50
6. American 214 107.00
7. US Airways 214 107.00
8. Delta 221 110.50
9. United 258 129.00
10. Alaska Air 279 139.50
See id. (children under two column added).
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asserted that the cost of requiring child restraint systems will cre-
ate a devastating increase in cost, both the airline industry and
parents of these small travelers. According the studies
presented by the FAA, the increase in costs will cause parents to
chose alternate methods of transportation, such as travel by
automobiles.
After examination of the arguments presented by the FAA, it
is obvious that this contention can be easily put to rest. There is
not sufficient evidence to make the assumption that an increase
in travel costs or a loss in profits for the airline industry would
occur, due to the mandatory use of child restraint systems.
There is no evidence that families would be forced to give up
flying and travel by car instead.
The FAA also asserts that the mandatory requirement of the
use of child restraint systems will result in an extraordinary loss
in revenue to the airline industry. This argument is misguided
for two reasons. First, the airlines cannot experience a loss in
revenue because children under the age of two have always been
allowed to ride for free on the laps of their parents. Second,
supporters of the legislation, and the airlines themselves have
indicated, that the parents of children should not be required to
pay a full fare of a regular ticket. There have been several sug-
gestions and programs implemented by airlines to give parents
incentives to purchase seats for their children.
The need for the use of child restraint systems on aircraft is
an issue that is not likely to be resolved soon. Without such leg-
islation, children will continue to face potential injuries from
injury during taxiing, take-off, landing, and in-flight turbulence.
The life of one child is worth the implementation of such legis-
lation. Experts and supporters alike have indicated that such
legislation can be implemented with little cost to the industry
and parents. The real issue, however, is the value of the lives of
innocent children compared against the cost to purchase a re-
straint system.
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